Abstract. Conventional authenticated encryption (AE) schemes put emphasis on the single-user setting, which only allow one signer to produce an authenticated ciphertext such that merely the designated recipient is capable of recovering the message and verifying its corresponding signature. In the multi-user environments, e.g., organizational operations, several senior managers might cooperatively sign a confidential business contract according to the organizational signing policies. To fulfill such application requirements, in this paper, we propose a secure (t, n) threshold convertible authenticated encryption (TCAE) scheme and its variant with message linkages for the multi-user environment. In our proposed scheme, any t or more signers can cooperatively generate a valid authenticated ciphertext while less than or equal to t1 cannot. In case of a later dispute over repudiation, the designated recipient can solely convert the authenticated ciphertext into an ordinary multi-signature without extra computational efforts for protecting his benefits. Moreover, the security requirement of confidentiality against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and that of unforgeability against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) are proved in the random oracle model. Compared with related works, our scheme provides not only better functionalities, but also lower computational costs.
Introduction
The public key cryptosystem was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman [1] in 1976. Based on the intractability of solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [1, 2] , the public key system equips each user with a private key and the corresponding public key which is accessible to anyone. It is computationally infeasible for any malicious adversary to derive the private key from its known public one. The public key encryption and digital signature schemes [3] [4] [5] are two vital mechanisms of public key systems. When communicating over an insecure channel like the Internet, a sender can deliver a message encrypted with the receiver's public key to the destination such that only the intended receiver can decrypt the ciphertext with his own private key. It thus can be seen that the public key encryption fulfills the security requirement of confidentiality [6] . As to further achieving the property of authenticity [7] , an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme introduced by Horster et al. [8] is applicable. Such schemes enable a signer to generate an authenticated ciphertext such that only the designated recipient has the ability to recover the message and verify its corresponding signature. It is not necessary to establish a secret channel between the signer and the designated recipient in advance. Yet, a later dispute that the signer repudiates his signatures might occur. To eliminate the drawback, in 1999, Araki et al. [9] proposed a convertible limited verifier signature scheme which provides the signature conversion mechanism to deal with the dispute. However, some extra computational cost will be incurred during the conversion. In 2002, Wu and Hsu [10] proposed a convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) scheme in which the signature conversion process is rather simple and can be solely done by the designated recipient without any additional communicational and computational cost. That is to say, CAE schemes further satisfy the requirement of non-repudiation [11] . In 2005, Chen and Jan [12] proposed CAE schemes using selfcertified public key system [13] . Peng et al. [14] addressed a publicly verifiable authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages for transmitting a large message. Later, Lv et al. [15] further proposed a more secure and practical CAE scheme to improve the Wu-Hsu scheme. To orient this research topic, Hwang and Liu [16] have given detailed overview and analyses in relation to the key issues of AE/CAE schemes.
With the diversified development of E-Commerce, group-oriented applications play an important role in the modern society. In the multi-user environments, e.g., organizational operations, several senior managers might cooperatively sign a confidential business contract. In such a case, traditional cryptographic schemes focusing on the single-user setting are not applicable here. Although threshold signature schemes [17] permit a subset of signers to produce a valid signature on behalf of the entire signing group, they are not suitable for the situation where confidentiality is regarded as a crucial property. To fulfill the above group-oriented application requirement, in 2008, Wu et al. [18] proposed a convertible multi-authenticated encryption scheme which enables a signing group composed of multiple signers to generate a valid authenticated ciphertext. In 2009, Tsai [19] improved Wu et al.' s scheme by reducing the computational costs and removing the necessity of message redundancy. However, we find out that Tsai's scheme still cannot satisfy the security requirement of indistinguishability since anyone can easily identify the encrypted message from two candidate messages for a given ciphertext. Based on Wu et al.'s scheme, Chang [20] also presented another variant with shared verification of multiple designated recipients. Lin and Yeh [21] further proposed a threshold convertible authenticated encryption (TCAE) scheme allowing any t or more signers to cooperatively generate a valid authenticated ciphertext on behalf of the original signing group. Nevertheless, the computational costs of the Lin-Yeh scheme are rather high and no formal security proofs are given. Considering the key-compromise problem in 2011, Hsu and Lin [22] proposed an identity-based keyinsulated convertible multi-authenticated encryption scheme.
In this paper, we propose a secure (t, n)-TCAE scheme and its variant with message linkages. The variant with message linkages is especially suitable for the transmission of a large message over the public network. When the signing group repudiates having generated their authenticated ciphertext, the designated recipient can convert the authenticated ciphertext into an ordinary multi-signature for public verification without neither extra computational costs nor the cooperation of the signers. Besides, the security requirement of confidentiality against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and that of unforgeability against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) are proved in the random oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the first provably secure (t, n)-TCAE scheme based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP). Compared with previous works, ours provides not only better functionalities, but also lower computational costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states some preliminaries. The formal model of our proposed scheme is defined in Section 3. We introduce the proposed (t, n)-TACE scheme and its variant with message linkages in Section 4. Some comparisons and the security proofs are detailed in Section 5. Finally, a conclusion is made in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review some security notions and the concept of random oracle model.
Discrete Logarithm Problem; DLP
Let p and q be two large primes satisfying q | p 1, and g a generator of order q over GF(p). The discrete logarithm problem is, given an instance (y, p, q, g), where y = g x mod p for some x  Zq, to derive x.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption
Let Ik = {(p, q, g)  I | |p| = k} with k  N, where I is the universe of all instances and |p| represents the bitlength of p. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial P() and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the DLP with an advantage at most 1/P(k), i.e.,
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance with a given security parameter k and over the random choices of A. 
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem; CDHP
Let p and q be two large primes satisfying that q|p1 and g a generator of order q over GF(p). The computational Diffie-Hellman problem is, given an instance (p, q, g, g a , g b ) for some a, b  Zq, to derive g ab mod p.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
Let Ik = {(p, q, g)  I | |p| = k} with k  N, where I is the universe of all instances and |p| represents the bitlength of p. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial P() and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the CDHP with an advantage at most 1/P(k), i.e.,
Random Oracle Model
In the random oracle model, a cryptographic hash function is simulated as a random oracle which must be queried in order to obtain the corresponding output with respect to a given input. That is to say, an adversary can query a hash oracle for his chosen input and a challenger will return the response. An adaptive chosenmessage attacker (CMA) is also allowed to query the signature for his chosen messages adaptively while an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacker (CCA2) is further given the ability to query the plaintext for his chosen ciphertexts for several times. A signature scheme is said to be CMA-secure in the random oracle model if there is no polynomial-time adversary that can forge a valid signature with non-negligible advantage. Similarly, an encryption mechanism is said to be CCA2-secure in the random oracle model if there is no polynomial-time adversary that can decrypt the target challenge with non-negligible advantage.
Formal Model of Our Proposed Scheme
This section defines the formal model of our proposed (t, n)-TCAE scheme.
Involved Parties
A (t, n)-TCAE scheme has two kinds of involved parties: a group of n signers and a designated recipient. Each one is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPTM). Any t or more signers can cooperatively produce a valid authenticated ciphertext on behalf of the group while less than or equal to t  1 cannot. Finally, the designated recipient decrypts the ciphertext and verifies the multi-signature.
Composed Algorithms
The proposed (t, n)-TCAE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
 Setup: Taking as input 1 k where k is a security parameter, the algorithm generates the system's public parameters params.
The ACG algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, a message m, the public key of designated recipient and the private keys of at least t signers. It generates the resulted authenticated ciphertext . The SRV algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, an authenticated ciphertext , the private key of designated recipient and the public key of the signing group. It outputs the message m and its converted multi-signature  if the authenticated ciphertext  is valid. Otherwise, the symbol ¶ is returned as a result.
The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we introduce the proposed scheme along with its variant over a finite field and then demonstrate its correctness. One realistic application for our proposed scheme is business contract signing. Suppose that a board of directors for some company consists of n persons. According to the regulation, a valid contract must be signed by at least t directors where t  n. Since the content of this business contract is confidential, only the lawyer of corresponding company is able to verify it. Based on the roles of the above example, the board of n directors could be regarded as the original signing group, t directors who have signed the contract are the actual signing subgroup and the lawyer is viewed as the designed verifier in the following construction.
In the proposed scheme, there are three main phases including Setup, Authenticated-Ciphertext-Generation (ACG) and Signature-Recovery-and-Verification (SRV). In Setup phase, a system authority is responsible for generating necessary system parameters along with each user's key pair. In ACG phase, a subgroup of t signers will cooperatively generate a valid authenticated ciphertext with the assistance of a clerk. Finally, in SRV phase, a designated verifier can decrypt the ciphertext and verify the corresponding multi-signature. If necessary, the designated verifier has the right to reveal a converted multi-signature for public verification.
Construction
 Setup: Taking as input 1 k , the system authority (SA)
t-1 for all di's  Zq, two large primes p and q where |q| = k and q | (p  1), and g a generator of order q. Let h1:
h3: *  {0, 1} k and h4: *  Zq be collision resistant hash functions. The system publishes the public parameters params = {p, q, g, h1, h2, h3} and derives each user Ui's private key xi = f(i). The corresponding public key is computed as
Without loss of generality, let O = {U1, U2, …, Un} be the signing group, SO = {U1, U2, …, Ut} the subgroup composed of t signers who cooperatively generate a valid authenticated ciphertext on behalf of O, and Uck a semi-trusted clerk who is responsible for verifying individuals' signatures and combining them into the corresponding authenticated ciphertext. A semi-trusted third party is said to be honest but curious, i.e., he will not perform anything that deviates from the predefined procedures, but he might attempt to learn any secret information from observed messages. The private key of O is d0 and the corresponding public key is y = g 0 mod . For signing the message mR {0, 1} k , each Ui  SO first chooses ri R Zq to compute the Lagrange coefficient [23] 
and then sends Ri to Uj  SO \ {Ui} and Uck. Upon receiving all Rj's, Ui  SO computes
si is then delivered to the clerk Uck via a secure channel. After receiving all si's, Uck verifies whether
If it does not hold, si is requested to be sent again;
The authenticated ciphertext  = (Q1, Q2, R, T) is then delivered to the designated recipient Uv.
 Signature-Recovery-and-Verification (SRV):
and then checks the redundancy embedded in m. Uv can further verify the multi-signature by checking
When the case of a later dispute over repudiation occurs, Uv can announce the converted multi-signature  = (R, s) and the message m to convince the third party of the signing group's dishonesty without any additional computational effort or communicational overhead. Therefore, with the assistance of Eq. (15), anyone can verify the converted multi-signature.
Correctness
The correctness proof includes two parts: correct recovery of the message and effective verification of the multi-signature. To recover the message, the designated recipient must first derive the common secret K and then use Eq. (14) to obtain the message. We show that the designated recipient can correctly compute the shared secret K with his private key and T, the last element of the received authenticated ciphertext. From the right-hand side of Eq. (12), we have
which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (12) . If the authenticated ciphertext (Q1, Q2, R, T) is correctly generated, it will pass the test of Eq. (15) . From the right-hand side of Eq. (15), we have ) (
(by Eq. (7)) ) (
(by Eq. (5)) ) ( 
Variant with Message Linkages
Due to the limited system bandwidth, an online processing system often has difficulty encrypting a large message. For example, for an encryption system such as RSA system which processes message block of 1024 bits, a 1KB message must be divided into 8 message blocks before encryption. In the subsection, we propose a variant with message linkages for facilitating this case by dividing a large message into lots of small message blocks. The construction is similar to that in Section 4.1. We only describe the different parts as follows:
For signing the large message m on behalf of the signing group O, each Ui  SO first divides the message m into z pieces, i.e., m = m1 || m2 || … || mz such that each ml has a suitable length, and then chooses ri R Zq and w0 = 0 to compute ci, ei, Ri, R and si as Eqs. (1) to (5) . The clerk Uck computes s, K, T and Q1 as Eqs. (7) to (10) . Uck further computes
and deliveries  = (Q1, R, T, w1, w2, …, wz) to the designated recipient Uv.
 Signature-Recovery-and-Verification (SRV):
Upon receiving the authenticated ciphertext  = (Q1, R, T, w1, w2, …, wz), Uv first computes K and s as Eqs. (12) and (13) . He then computes
and recovers the message m as m1 || m2 || … || mz. Uv can further verify the multi-signature by checking Eq. (15) .
We show that with the authenticated ciphertext (Q1, R, T, w1, w2, …, wz), the designated recipient Uv can recover the message m and check its validity with Eq. (17) . From the right-hand side of Eq. (17), we have
(by Eq. (16)) = ml (mod p) which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (17).
Security Proof and Comparison
In this section, we first address the security model with respect to the proposed scheme and prove it in the random oracle model. Then some comparisons with related schemes are made.
Security Model
Any cryptographic scheme simultaneously satisfying the properties of confidentiality and authenticity should consider the security requirements of message confidentiality and unforgeability. The widely accepted notion for the security of message confidentiality comes from the definition of indistinguishability-based security, i.e., the adversary attempts to distinguish a target ciphertext with respect to two candidate messages. We define these notions as follows: 
Definition 4. (Unforgeability) A (t, n)-TCAE scheme is said to achieve existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (EF-CMA) if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A with non-negligible advantage in the following game played with a challenger B:
Setup: B first runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm and sends the system's public parameters params to the adversary A.
Phase 1:
The adversary A adaptively issues ACG queries as those in Phase 1 of Definition 3. 
Security Proof
We prove that the proposed scheme achieves the IND-CCA2 and the EF-CMA security in the random oracle model as Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. The security proofs can also be applied to its variant with message linkages, since they have almost the same structure. 
Theorem 1. (Proof of Confidentiality)
if (check(Q_h1, m)) = true) then // h1(m, *) has ever been queried. 8: if (check(A_h3, v3)) = true) then 9:
for j = 0 to q h 3  1
10
: 
Analysis of the game:
Since B always returns a valid authenticated ciphertext for each issued ACG query without abortion, the simulation of ACG queries is said to be perfect. We then evaluate the simulation of SRV queries. Let SRV_ERR be the event that an SRV query fails during the entire game, i.e., an error symbol is returned for a valid authenticated ciphertext.
An SRV query for some valid  = (Q1, Q2, R, T) fails if A can produce  without asking the corresponding h1(m, R) or h3(K) random oracles beforehand. Let AC-V be an event that the authenticated ciphertext  of an SRV query made by A is valid. QH1 and QH3 separately denote the events that A has ever asked h1(m, R) and h3(K) random oracles beforehand. Then we can express the fail probability of any SRV query as
Besides, A can make at most qSRV SRV queries. Consequently, we can express the probability of SRV_ERR as
Also note that in the challenge phase, B has returned a simulated authenticated ciphertext * = (Q1*, Q2*, R*, T*) where T* = yD (s* + ) mod p, i.e., the value K* is implicitly defined as K* = yv d 0 (s + ) mod p. As long as the adversary A never makes an h3(K*) query in Phase 2, the entire simulation game could finish without abortion. Let QH3* be the event that A does make an h3(K*) query in Phase 2, and GP the event that the entire simulation game does not abort. When the entire simulation game is normally terminated, it is obvious that A gains no advantage in guessing , i.e.,
We can further rewrite Pr[ = ] as
Moreover, we can also derive that
Combing Eqs. (18) and (19), we obtain that
By the definition of A's advantage in the security model, we have
(by Eq. (22)
Rewriting the above inequality, we have
If the event QH3* happens, we claim that the value as the correct answer to the CDHP with non-negligible probability
The time required for B is t'  t + t(q h 2 + 4q ACG + 2q SRV ).
Q.E.D.
To prove that the proposed scheme achieves the EF-CMA security in the random oracle model, we utilize the Forking lemma [24] presented by Pointcheval and Stern. According to their proof techniques, we can directly obtain the same result as follows. More concretely, in our scheme, we can first obtain two equations below:
Then the private key d0 can be computed as
Still, to show the tight relation between the security of our proposed scheme and the intractability of the DLP, we give another more detailed security proof as Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2. (Proof of Unforgeability)
Here t is the cost for performing a modular exponentiation over a finite field. p, q, g, yD) as inputs. In this proof, B simulates a challenger to A in the following game.
Proof

Setup:
The challenger B runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm to obtain the system's public parameters params = {p, q, g, h1, h2, h3} and comes up with a random tape composed of a long sequence of random bits. Then B simulates one or two runs of (t, n)-TCAE scheme to the adversary A on input params, yD, yv = g  mod p
where   R Zq, and the random tape. 
Rewriting the above equality, we can obtain g v 2 = g s yD h 1 (m, R) mod p. Then B will be able to solve the DLP by computing
Since the supplied sequence of random bits are unpredictable and each random oracle is simulated without collision, we can expect that Pr[h2(m) = Rg v 2 ] = 2 1 , i.e., B would have the probability of 2 1 to solve the DLP in the first simulation on condition that the event (AC-V  NH) happens.
In the other hand, with the probability of (1  2 have a chance to solve the DLP. To evaluate B's success probability, we use the "Splitting lemma" [24] as follows: Let X and Y be the sets of possible sequences of random bits and random function values supplied to A before and after the h1(m, R) query is made, respectively. It follows that on inputting a random value (x || y) for any x  X and y  Y, A outputs a valid forgery with the probability of , i.e., Pr xX, yY [AC-V] = . By the "Splitting lemma", there exists a subset 
1
, we can express the probability that B solves the DLP in the second simulation as
Combining the result in the first simulation, we can derive that after the second simulation, B could solve the DLP with the success probability
In addition, the time required for B in one simulation is
We hence can represent the total time for B after the second simulation as t'  (2 1 )(t + t(q h 2 + 4q ACG )) + (1  2 1 )(t + t(q h 2 + 4q ACG )) = t + t(q h 2 + 4q ACG ).
According to Theorem 2, the proposed scheme is secure against existential forgery attack, which stands for that the signing group cannot deny having generated their authenticated ciphertext. Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
The proposed scheme satisfies the security requirement of non-repudiation.
Comparisons
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the first provably secure (t, n)-TCAE scheme based on the CDHP. We compare the proposed scheme with some related works including Lv [19] and the LinYeh (LY for short) [21] schemes in terms of functionalities and security proofs. Detailed comparisons are demonstrated as Table 1 .
To evaluate the computational performance, we further compare the proposed scheme with above group-oriented CAE ones in number of the most timeconsuming operation, i.e., modular exponentiation computation. The required computational costs with respect to each compared scheme are shown as Table 2 . From this table, it can be seen that if we let t  n, Tsai's scheme would have the same performance as ours. Yet, in practice, our scheme with threshold signing group would offer much more flexibility than Tsai's. To sum up, we claim that the proposed scheme provides not only better functionalities, but also lower computational costs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a secure (t, n)-TCAE scheme for confidential applications in the multi-user environment. A variant with message linkages is also introduced for facilitating the situation where a large message needs to be transmitted over the public network. Both the proposed scheme and its variant can simultaneously satisfy the security requirements of authenticity, confidentiality and nonrepudiation. Unlike previous schemes focusing on the single-user setting, our proposed scheme and its variant allow any t or more signers to cooperatively generate a valid authenticated ciphertext. The conversion mechanism enables the designated recipient to publicize the signing group's ordinary multi-signature for protecting his benefits. Furthermore, we also proved that the proposed scheme achieves the IND-CCA2 and the EF-CMA security in the random oracle model. Compared with related works, ours provides not only better functionalities, but also lower computational costs. Remark *: Let t be the threshold value and n the size of signing group. The computational costs include those executed by each signer in the signing group, the clerk and the designated recipient.
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